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In June 1953, just 51 years ago, the International North Pacific
Fisheries Convention (Convention)--one of the most important fishery
treaties in modem history-entered into force. Negotiated in Tokyo during
November and December 1951, its signatories were Japan, Canada, and the
United States. Under its terms, the tripartite North Pacific Fisheries
Commission was established to oversee and evaluate scientific research
on the condition of salmon, halibut, and other designated fish stocks in
the eastern North Pacific Ocean area. In addition, the Commission was
empowered to establish actual allocation levels for the catch in high seas
waters. 1
This treaty was historic in ways that are well worthy of our attention
today, as we recall the several dimensions of its context when the three
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North Pacific nations fashioned its terms.
First, it was noteworthy if for no other reason than it was the first
international agreement undertaken by the government of Japan beyond
the Peace Treaty and defense pact that ended the postwar occupation
(1945-52) and restored Japan to full sovereign status in the global
community of nations. The timing accurately reflected the exceptionally
important place of ocean fishing in the Japanese economy and in Japan's
diplomatic priorities.
A second historic feature of the Convention was that it represented the
culmination of the United States government's postwar policy of
promoting the rapid and full restoration of Japan's fishing capacity. The
Occupation, under General Douglas MacArthur, had given high priority
to rebuilding Japan's fishing fleets as a way of stimulating general
economic recovery while providing for Japanese nutritional needs. Over
the bitter objections of the British Commonwealth, China, and the
Philippines, MacArthur's Occupation regime returned Japan to Antarctic
whaling and promoted the expansion of distant water fishing, including
factory ship expeditions for tuna in the South Pacific. The Occupation
also promoted fish exports even when they meant new competition for
the American fishing industry, and it built up the trawling fleet to the
point where by 1949 it was depleting stocks in waters off the Chinese
and Korean coastlines. Hence, the Convention should be seen as the
capstone of an established policy. To be sure, as will be explained
below, the treaty placed a seaward limit in the Northeast Pacific beyond
which Japan was committed to refrain from fishing salmon or halibut
under specified conditions, and, in that sense, worked against Japan's
desires. But that limit was only one feature of a larger U.S. policy that
championed Japanese fishing interests and the expansion of Japan's
fishing enterprises in far-flung areas of the globe. Perhaps most important
to remember is that this largely benevolent U.S. policy toward Japan was
pursued in a way that overrode and ignored the wishes and interests of
America's wartime allies.2
A third aspect of the Convention that gave it great significance in
1953 was its introduction into ocean law and diplomacy of what was
known as the "abstention doctrine" or "abstention rule." This phrase
referred to terms of the Convention by which each power agreed to
abstain from fishing of those species that were determined scientifically
to be under exploitation at or beyond the point of "maximum sustained
yield" (MSY). In this respect, the treaty represented a major departure
2. See, e.g., HARRY N. SCHEIBER, INTER-ALLIED CONFLICTS AND OCEAN LAW,
1945-53: THE OCCUPATION COMMAND'S REVIVAL OF JAPANESE WHALING AND MARINE
FISHERIES 192-93 (2001).
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from the traditional doctrine of freedom of fishing on the high seas, out
beyond the limits of offshore national jurisdiction (that is, beyond the
boundaries of the coastal States' territorial seas, typically three miles
offshore). Abstention was by agreement and hence voluntary, so that
technically freedom of the seas as the overriding principle was preserved.
Moreover, as became an issue later on, no nations other than the three
signatories were in any way legally obliged to abstain from fishing on
stocks that the Convention was protecting.
For many Japanese commentators, then and even today, the Convention
represented a surrender of the "freedom of the seas" principle, entirely to
Japan's disadvantage. These critics believe that in 1951, in the midst of
the Occupation, the U.S. Government extracted by duress a promise
from Japan's Prime Minister to conclude a fisheries agreement in return
for an early peace-treaty settlement.
The U.S. diplomatic archives, however, reveal that the State Department
did not force the terms of the treaty upon Japan; to the contrary, the
American negotiators were deeply worried that the talks would break
down at one point.5 In addition, the terms of the Convention-typically
3. The most prominent legal commentator who has advanced this view is Judge
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adviser to the Occupation headquarters in Japan and ranking U.S. diplomatic officer in
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negotiating on the basis of "ad hoc sovereign equality with the Governments of Canada
and the United States." See Memorandum from William Sebald to Japanese government
(Nov. 5, 1951) in JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TRIPARTITE FISHERIES
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(1951) (recording the official proceedings of the negotiations). The near-breakdown of
the conference is recalled by the U.S. head of delegation, William C. Herrington, in his
article cited infra, note 7.
denounced by Japanese legal and political commentators as harmful to
Japanese fishing interests-in fact were highly advantageous to Japan in
ways that the Japanese fishing industry and government officials fully
understood in 1951-53, as evidenced in recently opened archival records
in Tokyo.6 It appears that the Japanese realized that "abstention," as
defined in the Convention, would apply only to fish stocks that were
already under a scientific management regime with conservationist
purposes and where proof was forthcoming that the fish were being
exploited at MSY. There was no other such regime in effect anywhere
in the Pacific Rim or Indian Ocean at the time, and so the Japanese
negotiators were victorious in establishing the precedent on terms that
placed them in a position to resist efforts by other governments (such as
Australia's, which wanted to exclude Japan's fleets from waters in the
entire Southern Hemisphere) to use the Convention as a model for
exclusionist policies.7
Indeed, insofar as the Convention provided a model in international
fisheries diplomacy and management structure, it also advanced the
concept of the international commission. In that respect, it built upon an
ongoing aspect of U.S. policy, already expressed in American support
for the International Whaling Commission and the initiative of the U.S.
Government in creating commissions for the tropical tuna in the Eastern
Pacific and the ocean stocks in the Northwest Atlantic.8
Although the sustainability concept was central to the U.S.-Canadian
strategy in the negotiations and an essential element in the Convention, it
must be noted that the MSY concept, as understood fifty years ago, has
become the subject of heavy criticism and has been largely supplanted
by other concepts in management theory since that time. While the MSY
standard served well in its day in obtaining consent for conservationist
6. See discussion, based on files of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture, in the Japanese National Archives, Tokyo, in
SCHEIBER, supra note 2, at 179-82. See also Harry N. Scheiber, Japan, the North
Atlantic Triangle, and the Pacific Fisheries, 1930-1953: A Perspective on the Origins of
Modern Ocean Law, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 27 (2004).
7. The head of the American delegation and principal author of the abstention
doctrine, William C. Herrington, provides a valuable autobiographical account of the
Convention's negotiation. See William C. Herrington, In the Realm of Diplomacy and
Fish: Some Reflections on the International Convention on High Seas Fisheries in the
North Pacific Ocean and the Law of the Sea Negotiations, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 101 (1989).
For an account of conflicting Allied and U.S. positions vis-A-vis Japan's long-run
interests in the diplomatic context, based on evidence from the United States, Canadian,
Australian, United Kingdom, and New Zealand archives, see SCHEMER, supra note 2, at
175-96.
8. See, e.g., ALBERT W. KOERS, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF MARINE
FISHERIES: A STUDY OF REGIONAL FISHERIES ORGANIZATIONS (1973); Harry N. Scheiber,
Pacific Ocean Resources, Science, and Law of the Sea: Wilbert M Chapman and the
Pacific Fisheries, 1945-1970, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 381 (1986).
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ideas in management, it is now remembered as the precursor of more
protective concepts such as the precautionary principle and the
conservation of marine ecosystems as central features of modem high
seas fishery management.
Despite continuing tensions regarding the abstention doctrine and also
the specific allocation policies pursued over the years under its terms,
the Convention remained in effect for two decades-serving as the
mechanism for maintaining the uneasy but steady balance of fishing
powers in the Northeast Pacific Ocean area and as the protector of stocks
in the crucially important salmon fishery. In that respect, it bridged the
period from the immediate postwar settlement to the advent of the
extended 200-mile exclusive zones that rendered necessary a newly
designed regime both in the Northeast Pacific and in other ocean fishing
areas of the globe. 9  Even today, it casts a long shadow, as the
implementation of the United Nations Straddling Stocks Convention will
(if successful) revivify and apply the abstention doctrine in a new
context, while adapting in this new arena of high-seas fisheries
management the international commission model.
In the broadest historical perspective, the Convention laid the
groundwork for the modem-day norm of multi-lateralist style and
structure for sustainable management of ocean resources. It is fitting,
then, that a conference bringing together experts on ocean law and
policy from many countries would have gathered in 2003 at the
University of California, Berkeley to consider the current-day initiatives
in multilateralism and, at the same time, to recall their origins and
precursors starting with the International North Pacific Fisheries
Convention.
9. See generally, MANAGEMENT OF WORLD FISHERIES: IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDED
COASTAL STATE JURISDICTION (Edward L. Miles ed., 1989); and retrospective and
prospective essays in ORDER FOR THE OCEANS AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY (Davor
Vidas & Willy Ostreng eds., 1998); LAW OF THE SEA: TE COMMON HERITAGE AND
EMERGING CHALLENGES (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2000); and BRINGING NEW LAW TO
OCEAN WATERS (David D. Caron and Harry N. Scheiber, eds., 2004).
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